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KEY FINDINGS: 
 
• Changes in trade relationships 
with less-developed countries 
decreased the relative wages of 
high school dropouts by about 10 
percent between 1980 and 1995 
(Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 
1997). 
 
• Approximately 36 percent of 
displaced manufacturing workers 
in import-competing industries 
are reemployed at similarly 
paying or higher-paying jobs; 
about 35 percent experience 
earnings losses of more than 15 
percent (Kletzer 2004). 
 
• Between 2001 and 2003, 
workers in trade-competing 
service industries were 
approximately 75 percent more 
likely to experience job loss than 
were workers in service 
industries that did not compete 
with trade (Jensen and Kletzer 
2005). 
 
• Foreign investment by U.S. 
firms likely has little impact on 
exports or aggregate domestic 
employment (Lipsey 2004). 
 
• Investment by foreign firms in 
the United States has not 
contributed noticeably to skill-
based technical change, one of 
the major drivers of increasing 
inequality (Blonigen and 
Slaughter 2001). 
 
Globalization—the heading generally applied to the 
developments in trade and information technology that have 
made it easier for goods and services to flow back and forth 
across national boundaries—has the potential to heavily 
influence patterns of economic mobility in the United States. By 
allowing businesses to look internationally for efficient 
solutions, globalization may raise overall productivity and 
allow for widespread increases in living standards. However, 
critics have observed that globalization often pushes less-
skilled U.S. workers into damaging competition with lower-
paid foreign substitutes, reducing their bargaining power and 
making it more difficult for them to share in globalization’s 
benefits. In other words, globalization seems likely to lead to 
income growth (i.e., upward absolute mobility) at the high end 
of the skill spectrum, but may decrease rates of upward mobility 
among less-skilled workers both in absolute terms and in 
comparison to their higher-skilled peers. 
 
Current research does not directly address the impacts of globalization on economic mobility. 
However, a large body of literature discusses the implications that globalization has for 
unemployment and inequality in the United States. Together, these measures provide a reasonable 
proxy for intragenerational mobility. If globalization causes job or earnings losses for low-
skilled individuals at a given point in time, it may slow income growth over time for this group as 
well. Similar inferences are possible if globalization increases inequality, particularly if it does so 
by widening the gap between low- and middle-income families. Conclusions regarding the effects 
of globalization on intergenerational mobility will necessarily be more speculative, since 
globalization itself is a relatively new phenomenon. However, to the extent that globalization 
promotes economic growth over the long run, it will likely lead to upward absolute mobility as 
well, provided that any associated increases in inequality are not too large.   
 
Research on the international flow of goods and services can be grouped into three main 
categories according to the type of good or service. The first group seeks to assess the 
implications of traditional international trade—in particular, the increasing tendency of 
corporations to import intermediate goods for assembly in U.S. products. The second addresses 
impacts of what is commonly termed outsourcing—the use of foreign workers to perform 
services (like running call centers) that have traditionally been reserved for American workers. 
The third considers the consequences of foreign direct investment (FDI); i.e., U.S. firms’ 
international investments, and foreign investments in the United States.  
 
This review considers the implications that international trade, outsourcing, and FDI have for 
patterns of intragenerational mobility, in light of research on their wage, employment, and 
inequality effects. The text box below summarizes several key findings.  
Globalization and Economic Mobility 
International Trade  
 Changes in trade relationships with less-developed countries decreased the relative wages of 
high school dropouts by about 10 percent between 1980 and 1995 (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 
1997). 
  Approximately 36 percent of displaced manufacturing workers in import-competing 
industries are reemployed at similarly paying or higher-paying jobs; about 35 percent 
experience earnings losses of more than 15 percent (Kletzer 2004).  
Services Outsourcing 
 Between 2001 and 2003, workers in trade-competing service industries were approximately 
75 percent more likely to experience job loss than were workers in service industries that did 
not compete with trade (Jensen and Kletzer 2005).   
 Services outsourcing increased labor productivity by about 5 percent between 1992 and 
2000—approximately 10 percent of the total increase over the period (Amiti and Wei 2006). 
 Foreign Direct Investment 
 Foreign investment by U.S. firms likely has little impact on exports or aggregate domestic 
employment (Lipsey 2004).  
 Investment by foreign firms in the United States has not contributed noticeably to skill-based 
technical change, one of the major drivers of increasing inequality (Blonigen and Slaughter 
2001).  
 
 
International Trade 
Researchers investigating the labor market effects of international trade generally choose one of 
two approaches: either they focus on the way trade alters outcomes in the labor market as a 
whole, or they home in on the hardships faced by individuals whose work status has been affected 
by trade. These two strategies are complementary. While the first seeks to estimate the aggregate 
size of trade-associated labor market disruptions (generally in comparison to the effects of other 
potential causes of job or wage losses), the second aims to describe those disruptions in detail.  
 
Most recent reviews of the literature on the aggregate labor market effects of trade conclude that 
importing intermediate goods has relatively little impact on national-level employment and 
inequality. Though economic theory holds that importing intermediate outputs is equivalent to 
increasing the supply of the American workers in import-competing industries, and should 
therefore exert downward pressure on the wages of these workers, the size of such effects appears 
to be modest. This has held even as the imports from less-developed countries have increased as a 
percentage of U.S. GNP.
1
 In contrast, the obstacles faced by workers who are displaced by trade 
are typically larger than those faced by other workers. The table below summarizes two key 
empirical studies.  
Wage and Employment Effects of International Trade 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Borjas, Freeman, 
and Katz 1997 
(1960, 1970, 1980, 
1990 Census 
PUMS; 1995 CPS 
merged ORG) 
 
o Assesses the proportions of skilled and unskilled labor at various levels 
of immigration and trade, then evaluates the wage consequences of the 
skill distribution. 
o Findings: elimination of trade with less-developed countries (LDC) in 
1995 would have increased wages of HS dropouts by .012 to .033 log 
points (roughly 1 to 3 percent). Changes in trade with LDCs account 
less than 10 percent of the decrease in relative wages of U.S. dropouts 
between 1980 and 1995.  
o For comparison: changes in immigration levels account for 27 to 55 
percent of the decrease in relative wages of dropouts over the same 
period.   
 
Kletzer 2004 (CPS 
Displaced Worker 
Survey Supplement 
covering 1979-
1999) 
o Organizes industries by type (manufacturing or non-manufacturing) 
and level of import competition. Assesses reemployment and earnings 
recovery rates for workers in each category.   
o Findings: 63.4 percent of manufacturing workers in trade-competing 
sectors found jobs by the time they were surveyed (up to three years 
after displacement), compared to about 65.8 percent of other 
manufacturing workers.  
o Regardless of the level of trade competition, about 36 percent of 
displaced manufacturing workers who found new jobs were 
reemployed in jobs with equal or greater earnings. About 35 percent 
took jobs with earnings losses of more than 15 percent.  
 
Consider first the aggregate-level literature. Katz and Autor (1999) summarize evidence from the 
1990s and conclude that “demand shifts from skill-biased technological change and domestic 
sources of changes in relative skill supplies appear to be much more significant factors in the 
recent expansion of the U.S. college wage premium [a major driver of increasing inequality] than 
trade’s impact.” During the Clinton Administration, the Council of Economic Advisers reached a 
similar consensus, assigning international trade responsibility for roughly 10 percent of the 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that the work reviewed in this section does not reflect changes in this pattern that have 
taken place since the 1990s. Imports of manufactured goods from less-developed countries have continued 
to increase, potentially magnifying the negative effects of trade. For one estimate of the effects of more 
recent trade levels on wages and employment, see Bivens (2007).  
increase in inequality in the 1980s and early 1990s, somewhat more than the amount attributed to 
(respectively) declining unionization rates and the falling real value of the minimum wage, but far 
less than the roughly 45 percent attributed to technological change (Council of Economic 
Advisers 1997). In one important empirical study, Borjas, Katz, and Freeman (1997) found that 
trade with less-developed countries accounted for only 10 percent of high school dropouts’ wage 
losses between 1980 and 1995, while immigration accounted for between 27 and 55 percent.   
 
Though the drawbacks of trade are modest in their effects on the population as a whole, the 
negative consequences for the relatively small group of workers who are displaced by trade can 
be quite pronounced. Haveman (1993; as cited in Richardson 1995) finds that displaced workers 
in trade-competing sectors tend to suffer through longer periods of transitional unemployment 
than do other displaced workers—37 weeks, on average, compared to 22. These findings, 
however, are not nearly as robust after controlling for industry. That is, trade-displaced workers 
tend to face dramatically more adverse outcomes than do other displaced workers, but not more 
so than other displaced workers in similar industries. For instance, Kletzer (2004) used displaced 
worker surveys to find that 63.4 percent of manufacturing workers in trade-competing sectors 
who had been displaced in the past three years were reemployed at the time of the survey, a rate 
only slightly lower than the 65.8 percent reemployment rate for other manufacturing workers. 
Earnings losses are also similar for trade-competing and non-competing workers: roughly 36 
percent of the workers in each group are eventually reemployed at no loss of income, while 
roughly 35 percent are reemployed with earnings losses of greater than 15 percent.  
 
The picture that emerges is one in which trade-displaced workers are more likely to work in 
sectors characterized by older workers, longer job tenures, and lower educational attainment—
traits that make reemployment more difficult regardless of the reason for job loss. Trade does cost 
some workers their jobs, and these workers tend to be drawn from particularly vulnerable 
subgroups.  
 
Research on earnings recovery and reemployment after trade displacement can be interpreted 
more or less directly in terms of short-term economic mobility. The evidence thus suggests that 
international trade leads to downward economic mobility for a relatively small group of low-skill 
workers. By eliminating some of the higher-paying jobs available to such workers, trade may also 
inhibit upward mobility. Though these effects most likely make only a modest contribution to 
overall mobility rates, the consequences for affected workers are no doubt very large.  
 
Over the long term, the mobility consequences of international trade are likely more positive. By 
allowing countries to specialize in what they do best, trade may increase real income, at least at 
the aggregate level. Frankel and Romer (1999), for instance, estimate that, ceteris paribus, a one 
percentage-point increase in the ratio of trade to GDP increases a country’s average per capita 
income by at least half a percent. Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2005; as cited in Orszag and 
Deich 2006) conduct a meta-analysis using methods from four different studies, and find that, in 
2003, trade added roughly $1 trillion to the U.S. economy. Freeman (2003) provides a tongue-in-
cheek summary of the delicate balance in the trade debate, writing that “some will gain and some 
will lose… but the gainers will make more than the losers will lose… and neither the gains nor 
losses will be big enough to measure afterwards.” In this light, the effects of changes in trade 
policy on economic mobility in the country as a whole will likely prove to be quite muted.  
 
Services Outsourcing 
Outsourcing—defined here as the internationalization of services like computer programming and 
call-answering—is the frequent subject of political scrutiny. However, because the technology 
required to internationally integrate the service sector has only recently become available, long 
term effects are difficult to gauge. Economic theory suggests that the mobility consequences 
could be pronounced: just as importing intermediate outputs could exert downward pressure on 
the wages of the U.S. workers who produce competing goods, importing services traditionally 
provided by middle-class service and IT workers could depress wages for those workers. Such 
concerns lead some economists to worry that that service outsourcing could lead to a “hollowing 
out” of the U.S. middle class (GAO, 2005) by lowering wages paid to traditionally middle- and 
upper-middle-class workers like computer programmers and engineers while raising corporate 
profits that primarily accrue to those at the very top of the income distribution.  Alternate models 
suggest that, over time, outsourcing could in fact increase the demand for high-skilled labor in the 
United States, thereby increasing wages and facilitating upward mobility. The table below 
summarizes two recent, important studies of the effects of outsourcing on productivity and 
employment.  
 
Productivity and Employment Effects of Services Outsourcing 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Amiti and Wei 
2006 (BLS data on 
service input to 
industry 1992-
2000; IMF balance 
of payments 
yearbooks 1992-
2000) 
o First-differences regression of productivity on services offshoring, 
materials offshoring, and a set of covariates. 
o Findings:  services offshoring increased labor productivity by about 5 
percent between 1992 and 2000, or roughly 10 percent of the total 
increase in labor productivity over the period.  
 
Jensen and Kletzer 
2005 (January 2004 
Displaced Worker 
Survey; 2000 
Census PUMS) 
 
o Identifies tradable or non-tradable services based on geographic 
distribution of production (most other papers use published industry 
categories). Contrasts employment trends in tradable and non-tradable 
services and manufacturing industries; considers demographic and 
reemployment trends in displaced workers within each category. 
o Findings: greater risk of job loss in tradable services sector than in 
non-tradable services sector. Employment growth in tradable services 
is strong, except for individuals with low skills.  
 
Current evidence does not lend itself to simplistic interpretation. On one hand, services 
outsourcing may lead to job losses. A frequently cited report by the Forrester research group 
estimates that 3.3 million service-sector jobs could move abroad by 2015, up from 400,000 in 
2004 (McCarthy 2002). This equates to approximately 250,000 jobs lost per year, or less than 2 
percent of annual involuntary job loss (Brainerd and Litan 2004). Bhagwati et al. (2004) reach a 
similar estimate using data on employer’s stated reasons for layoffs. Jensen and Kletzer (2005) 
find that workers in tradable non-manufacturing jobs were approximately 75 percent more likely 
to experience job loss than were workers in similar but non-tradable jobs between 2001 and 2003. 
 
However, focusing on job losses alone does not fully capture the effects of services outsourcing. 
Jensen and Kletzer (2005) find that, between 1998 and 2002, growth in the tradable service 
employment was at least equal to growth in non-tradable service employment. In combination 
with the results above, this finding implies that services outsourcing does not eliminate jobs as 
much as it increases job turnover. Further, individuals displaced from tradable-service 
occupations tend, as a group, to do fairly well after job loss, particularly compared to displaced 
manufacturing workers. This can be attributed to their higher skill levels: Jensen and Kletzer 
report that 75 percent of displaced workers from tradable non-manufacturing occupations had at 
least some college experience, compared to 46 percent of displaced manufacturing workers. In 
sum, offshoring does cost some service-sector workers their jobs, but these people tend to get 
back on their feet more quickly than do, for example, manufacturing workers displaced by 
traditional international trade. As result, one might expect outsourcing to increase the short-term 
volatility of income. Its effects on the intragenerational mobility of permanent income, however, 
remain quite hazy.  
 
Over the long term, the effects of service outsourcing on mobility are likely tied to its impact on 
overall productivity. Most reports conclude that services outsourcing fosters productivity growth 
over the long term, though current evidence should be considered preliminary.2 Mann (2003) 
examines declines in the prices of PC components due to increases in global production capacity. 
She estimates that rising global production lowered the prices of domestic IT by about 20 percent, 
spurring IT investment and adding 0.3 percentage points per year to average GDP growth 
between 1995 and 2002. Amiti and Wei (2006) estimate a first-differences regression of 
productivity on services offshoring, materials offshoring, and a set of covariates. They find that 
services offshoring increased labor productivity by about 5 percent between 1992 and 2000, or 
roughly 10 percent of the total increase in labor productivity over the period.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
FDI is closely linked to both international trade and services outsourcing. Purchasing 
intermediate goods abroad is international trade; purchasing the foreign company that produces 
those goods is FDI. Similarly, employing a foreign firm to process technical support claims is 
services outsourcing, while purchasing that firm is FDI. As with these other manifestations of 
globalization, FDI has played an increasing role in production in recent years,
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 and has the 
potential to alter labor force outcomes by shifting demand for different types of work. 
Researchers typically distinguish between inward FDI (foreign investment in the U.S.) and 
outward FDI (U.S. investment abroad). Like international trade and outsourcing, outward FDI is 
double-edged: it could make it more difficult for U.S. workers to get ahead by increasing their 
vulnerability to foreign competition, but it could also help sustain economic growth by allowing 
U.S. firms to produce goods more efficiently. Inward FDI is generally seen in a more positive 
light.
4
 Foreign firms operating in the United States create job opportunities for U.S. workers, and 
may also improve the productivity of domestic firms by bringing with them international best 
practices. However, even if inward FDI is a net benefit, it may increase inequality by increasing 
demand for high-skill labor and decreasing demand for low-skill labor. The table below 
summarizes several studies investigating the tradeoffs inherent in FDI. 
                                                 
2
 In particular, the relatively short time-frame over which the consequences of services outsourcing can be 
assessed, combined with the strong assumptions often used to quantify the benefits of outsourcing argue for 
caution when interpreting these results. See Bivens (2005) for a critique of Mann (2003).  
3
 By one rough estimate, FDI played a role in 5 percent of world output in 1985, 6 percent in 1990, and 10 
percent in 2000 (Lipsey 2004). Graham and Krugman (1995) find that the level of investment by foreign 
firms in the US increased dramatically in the 1980s.  
4
 For instance, communities often bid to host foreign companies’ manufacturing facilities.  
FDI Effects on the U.S. Labor Market 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Blonigen and 
Slaughter 2001 
(NBER 
manufacturing 
productivity data 
1958-1994; various 
other sources of 
FDI data) 
 
o Evaluates contribution of foreign investments to skill upgrading in 
various U.S. industries.  
o Compares skill upgrading and foreign investment activity within 
various industries.  
o Findings: Foreign direct investment in the United States does not seem 
to be a major contributor to skill-based technical changes, on of the 
major causes of increasing in equality.  
Lipsey 2004 
(Review of 
literature on home 
and host country 
effects of 
outsourcing) 
 
o Studies of the United States and other developed countries generally 
show that investment abroad by multinational firms has little impact on 
home-country exports or employment. Within firms, foreign 
investment appears to reduce domestic labor intensity, but this effect is 
not evident at the industry level.  
o Foreign investment in the United States generally contributes to rising 
average wage levels and higher productivity.  
Lipsey 1999 (1989 
Department of 
Commerce survey 
on outward FDI by 
U.S. firms) 
 
o Presents descriptive measures of the contribution of U.S.-based 
multinational firms to productivity and employment. Regresses 
domestic employment of multinational firms on a set of covariates 
including affiliate production.  
o Findings: Foreign investment by U.S. multinationals between 1977 and 
1997 had no impact on aggregate employment. However, within firms, 
higher levels of production by foreign affiliates are associated with 
somewhat lower employment, but possibly with higher wages as well.  
 
In terms of its potential effects on earnings and employment in the United States, outward FDI 
resembles other types of international exchange, like trade and services outsourcing, in that it 
promotes overall growth but may be accompanied by costs for individuals at the bottom of the 
skill distribution. Kravis and Lipsey (1988) use data from a 1982 Department of Commerce study 
of U.S. firms’ investment abroad, and regress parent company employment on parent company 
sales and sales of foreign affiliates. They find that, in most industries, increased affiliate sales 
reduce parent-company employment, with each additional million dollars of affiliate sales 
corresponding to approximately 3 to 10 lost jobs, depending on the industry. They also find a 
“faintly positive” relationship between affiliate production and parent-company skill level (using 
average wage as a proxy for skill), suggesting that increasing outward FDI may increase the 
demand for skilled domestic workers.  
 
Lipsey (2004) conducts a qualitative review of the major papers on the subject. He finds that, at 
the firm level, increased international production is often associated with decreasing domestic 
labor intensity, and, more loosely, with a shift towards high-skill domestic jobs. At the industry 
level, however, studies find negligible effects. Lipsey speculates that this discrepancy may be the 
result of substitution between multinational and non-multinational firms. For instance, the effects 
of a multinational firm substituting foreign production for domestic production may be mitigated 
if national firms respond by increasing the labor intensity of their domestic work. The evidence 
that outward FDI has harmful mobility consequences is, on the whole, quite tenuous; but, if 
outward FDI does decreases upward mobility for any group, it is likely to be less-skilled workers.  
Researchers seeking to assess the effects of outward FDI on U.S. economic growth generally look 
at FDI’s effects on exports or overall employment. Effects here are relatively muted. Brainard and 
Riker (1997) use confidential firm data provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
estimate a regression model of the relationship between wages and employment in developing 
countries and U.S. employment. They find that, while decreasing wages in one developing 
country tend to decrease employment in countries competing for U.S. FDI, employment in the 
United States is affected only marginally. For instance, a 10 percent decrease in wages paid by 
multinationals to Mexican employees decreases employment at Malaysian affiliates by 1.6 
percent while employment at U.S. parent companies falls only 0.17 percent. Lipsey (1999) 
compares aggregate data on multinational production and employment, and finds no evidence that 
the shift of production to foreign affiliates reduced employment between 1977 and 1997. In sum, 
current research indicates that outward FDI will likely have only minimal effects on economic 
mobility, as its impacts on overall economic growth and skill demand have been quite small.  
 
Studies of inward FDI often focus on the wage differential between foreign- and domestically 
owned firms. In general, firms in the former group tend to pay higher wages than those in the 
latter, though it is difficult to tell whether there is indeed a wage premium for workers at a given 
skill level. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) match 1987 and 1992 Economic Census data on firm 
establishment with Bureau of Economic Analysis data on foreign firm ownership, and regress 
average wages on a set of covariates including ownership, industry, plant location, and plant size. 
They find that, controlling for these characteristics, foreign ownership has little effect on 
manufacturing wages but increases non-manufacturing wages by 7-8 percent. Conyon et al. 
(1999; as cited in Lipsey 2002) use longitudinal firm data from the U.K. to estimate the effect of 
foreign acquisition on wages. They find that firms purchased by foreign companies typically raise 
wages by about 3.4 percent, compared to a 2.1 percent decrease in firms acquired by domestic 
companies, even after controlling for firm and industry effects.  
Further, inward FDI does not seem to be a major contributor to the widening gap between the 
wages of low- and high-skilled workers, although the findings here are preliminary (Blonigen and 
Slaughter 2001). Because it is possible that foreign firms tend to acquire only those U.S. firms 
that are particularly promising, it is difficult to determine whether foreign acquisition causes 
wage growth, or is merely correlated with it. However, the data do suggest that inward FDI is at 
least neutral when it comes to promoting wage growth (and therefore upward mobility) over the 
short term, and may in fact be beneficial.  
 
In the long run, as with trade and outsourcing, the effects of inward FDI on upward mobility are 
likely tied to its impacts on productivity. The evidence that inward FDI increases the productivity 
of developed countries like the United States is fairly strong.
5
 Keller and Yeaple (2003), find 
significant gains, estimating that technology transferred from foreign companies operating in the 
United States accounted for 14 percent of productivity growth in U.S firms between 1987 and 
1996. Similarly, Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) find that, in the United Kingdom, a 10 
percentage-point increase in foreign investment in a given industry increases plant-level 
productivity by about half a percent. Foreign investment in the United States, therefore, likely 
encourages upward mobility over the long term.  
 
                                                 
5
 Studies of less-developed countries often find negligible or negative productivity effects; see, for example 
Aitken and Harrison 1999, or the review Lipsey and Sjolholm (2005).  
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